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TERM OF THE COURT

injuries). To hold otherwise would be to approve a second suit
which may ultimately prove to be completely fruitless or at
least redundant in important respects."
The effect of Drake is to clarify two options open to a plaintiff injured by the negligence of an uninsured motorist:
(1) Based on Collicott, an immediate suit may be brought
against his own insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage
even if other potentially liable sources are available for suit; or
(2) An action may be commenced against the uninsured motorist and other potentially liable parties and proceed to
judgment, after which it can be determined whether a recovery
has been yielded in excess of the uninsured motorist policy
coverage, thus precluding any recovery against the plaintiff's
own insurer.
DAVID P. LOWE

LABOR

I. FAm EMPLOYMENT
A. Right to DiscriminationHearing
In Watkins v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations,' the supreme court held that the Fair Employment
Act 2 requires the Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations (DILHR) to make a discrimination determination if
demanded by the complainant even though the employer or
union has rectified the alleged discrimination after the filing of
the complaint. No determination, however, is required if the
parties later enter into a bilateral conciliation agreement.
The complainant in Watkins was a black woman employed
by the Milwaukee County social services department. She alleged in her complaint that the employer had discriminated
against her because of her race in refusing her a requested job
transfer. Before the department made its initial determination
as required by Wisconsin Statutes section 111.36(3) (a), 3 she
68. 70 Wis. 2d at 982-83, 236 N.W.2d at 207.
1. 69 Wis. 2d 782, 233 N.W.2d 360 (1975).
2. Wis. STAT. § 111.31 et seq. (1973).
3. Wis. STAT. § 111.36(3)(a) (1973).
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received the transfer. A conciliation conference was held pursuant to section 111.36(3)(9),' but the complainant refused to
enter into a conciliation agreement and demanded a hearing.
Following the hearing, the department entered an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the transfer had
eliminated any discrimination. No determination was made
whether there had been discrimination prior to the transfer. On
review, the circuit court reversed the order and remanded for
determination of the question whether the employer had discriminated against the complainant before the transfer. The
supreme court affirmed the circuit court ruling.
In support of its position, DILHR argued that the transfer
amounted to a conciliation, thus precluding a discrimination
determination. 5 The court rejected the argument, holding that
a conciliation must be agreed upon by both parties: "Conciliation requires the assent of both disputing parties to the proposition that the dispute has ended. Unilateral offers by the employer and union, when they are threatened with a finding of
discrimination, do not in and of themselves constitute conciliation."' It also noted that publicity of discrimination findings
was one of the means available to the department to encourage
fair employment.7 The broad interpretation of conciliation
urged by DILHR, it held, would avoid legitimate discrimination findings and "reduce the situations in which exposure and
publicity would serve as a deterrent to future discrimination." 8
The primary argument advanced by the department was
that the discrimination issue was moot at the hearing stage
because at that time the complainant had been transferred.
The court, however, ruled that the issue was not moot because
there would be a practical legal effect to resolving the discrimination question, even though there was no issue of back pay,9
in that (1) the department could order the employer to con4. Id.
5. See Murphy v. Industrial Comm'n, 37 Wis. 2d 704, 711, 155 N.W.2d 545, 157
N.W.2d 568 (1968).
6. 69 Wis. 2d at 791, 233 N.W.2d at 364.
7. Wis. STAT. § 111.36(1) (1973).
8. 69 Wis. 2d at 793, 233 N.W.2d at 365.
9. Wis. STAT. § 111.36(3)(b) (1973) authorizes the department to order back pay,
which often makes a discrimination determination necessary although the employer
has granted the relief sought prior to the hearing. The transfer sought by the complain-

ant in Watkins carried the same rate of pay as her original position.
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sider the complainant for future transfers without regard to her
race, and (2) that the complainant was entitled to know
whether she had been discriminated against because of the
"deep personal frustration"'" she suffered before being transferred. The court seemed to be searching hard to justify its
ruling since a resolution of personal frustration seems like little
more than a personal vindication of one's position, and any
order to the employer to avoid discrimination in the future
would be superfluous, as the Fair Employment Act prohibits
such discrimination.
The court also stated as an additional reason for its decision
on the mootness issue that to prohibit a hearing on the grounds
of mootness would encourage employers to resist compliance
with the Act until the filing of a complaint and then to quickly
comply and move for dismissal. Evidently the court assumed
that the inconvenience and adverse publicity of the hearing
process and discrimination finding would serve as an effective
deterrent.
B. Sex Discrimination
In a second decision under the Fair Employment Act, RayO-Vac v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations," the supreme court squarely faced the question
whether it is sex discrimination for an employer to provide
different disability benefits for a pregnancy-related disability
than for other types of disabilities. The court had touched on
this issue last term in Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Department
of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 2 but did not reach
the merits of the case because procedural defects necessitated
a rehearing. The court in dicta in Wisconsin Telephone, however, did state that there is sex discrimination under section
111.32(5)(g)' 3 : "if [the employer] is found to have treated temporary disability due to pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities with respect to leave time, benefits, seniority, re-employment rights, etc., without what the department
might consider an adequate business justification."' 4
This rule was applied in Ray-O-Vac. The complainant
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

69 Wis. 2d
70 Wis. 2d
68 Wis. 2d
Wis. STAT.
68 Wis. 2d

at 794, 233 N.W.2d at 366.
919, 236 N.W.2d 209 (1975).
345, 228 N.W.2d 649 (1975).
§ 111.32(5)(g) (1973).
at 366, 228 N.W.2d at 661.
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charged, and the Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations found, that the employer's disability insurance plan
was discriminatory because (1) it provided a shorter maximum
benefit period for pregnancy-related disability than for other
disabilities, and (2) pregnancy-related disability benefits were
payable only if the employee was actively employed at the
commencement of both pregnancy and disability, whereas benefits were payable for other disabilities if the disability alone
began during active employment. The court ruled that either
of these practices was grounds for a finding of sex discrimination.
The employer, relying on Geduldig v. Aiello," which the
United States Supreme Court decided on the basis of the fourteenth amendment," argued that the plan was not discriminatory because the same benefits were provided to all pregnant
employees. The Wisconsin court had indicated in Wisconsin
Telephone that it would not accept this argument, since the
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act standard was broader than
the fourteenth amendment test." It reiterated this reasoning in
Ray-O-Vac, emphasizing the practical effect of the disparate
benefit policy:
The relevant question here is whether, in light of its purpose,
the effect of the benefits program is to provide disparate
treatment for men and women employees. The undeniable
thrust of Ray-O-Vac's "Group Insurance Plan" is to provide
financial assistance to its employees who are temporarily disabled. In this context, the matter to be determined is
benefits, men and
whether, as to eligibility for and amount of
8
women are treated alike under the plan.
The employer also contended that providing pregnancy disability benefits on the same basis as benefits for other disabilities would greatly increase costs and that this would qualify as
an adequate business necessity excusing the discriminatory
practice. The court found no evidence in the record to support
the allegation that Ray-O-Vac's costs would be substantially
increased. It did state, however, that "greatly increased costs
15. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. 68 Wis. 2d at 367, 228 N.W.2d at 661.
18. 70 Wis. 2d at 930-31, 236 N.W.2d at 214 (footnote omitted).
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should be considered a factor excusing a discriminatory practice."'"
I.

A.

WORKER'S COMPENSATION

"Contractor Under" Interpretation

The court this term overruled a long line of cases narrowly
interpreting the "contractor under" portion of the Worker's
Compensation Act 0 and restored an early broad construction
of the statute. In Green Bay Packaging,Inc. v. Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations,' the court held that the
test for liability under section 102.06 is whether the principal
employer is liable for injury to employees of a contractor or
subcontractor where he would have been liable for compensation if the employee had been working directly for him. In
contrast to the former rule, it is now irrelevant whether the
work done by the contractor or subcontractor is of the type
usually done by the principal employer.
Tracing the judicial construction of section 102.06, the court
noted that the early case Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Industrial Commission22 gave a similar interpretation to the
statute emphasizing the question of whether the employer
would have been liable had the injured employee been working
directly for him. Shortly after the A. & P. decision, however,
the court in Madison Entertainment Corp. v. Industrial
Commission23 altered the test to make the principal employer
liable only if the contractor or subcontractor was carrying on
the usual business of the principal employer or performing contractual duties which the principal contractor owed to a third
party. The basis of this restricted interpretation was a determination that section 102.06 was in essence an antifraud statute
designed to prevent employers from avoiding liability by sub19. 70 Wis. 2d at 934, 236 N.W.2d at 216.
20. Wis. STAT. ch. 102 (1973). Section 102.06 provides in pertinent part:
An employer shall be liable for compensation to an employe of a contractor or
subcontractor under the employer who is not subject to this chapter, or who has
not complied with the conditions of s. 102.28(2) in any case where such employer
would have been liable if such employe had been working directly for the employer, including also work in the erection, alteration, repair or demolition of
improvements or of fixtures upon premises of such employer which are used or
to be used in the operations of such employer . . ..
21. 72 Wis. 2d 26, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976).
22. 205 Wis. 7, 236 N.W. 575 (1931).
23. 211 Wis. 459, 248 N.W. 415 (1933).
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letting their work to independent contractors. Madison
2
Entertainmentwas followed in numerous cases. 1
In Green Bay Packaging,the court concluded that Madison
Entertainment and subsequent cases had incorrectly
interpreted section 102.06. It based this conclusion on both the
express language of the statute and on the purpose of section
102.06, which is designed to protect employees of contractors
who are not covered by the Worker's Compensation Act or are
not in compliance with its mandatory insurance requirements.
The Green Bay Packaging test focuses on whether the circumstances were such that the principal employer would be liable
if the injured employee had been working directly for him.
The court cautioned, however, that this broader construction would not make employers liable for injuries to employees
of all persons with whom they contract:
[Wie do not mean to impose liability upon principal employers for the employees of all persons with whom they have
contractual relations, however slight ....
By a contractor
under we mean to refer to one who regularly furnished to a
principal employer materials or services which are integrally
related to the furnished product or service provided by that
principal employer.
B. Nontraumatically Caused Mental Injury
Two years ago, in School District No. 1 v. Department of
Industry, Labor and Human Relations,2" the supreme court
announced the rule that nontraumatically caused mental injury may be compensable under the Worker's Compensation
Act, 27 although it did not find a compensable injury in that
case. The rule was stated as follows:
[Miental injury nontraumatically caused must have resulted from a situation of greater dimensions than the dayto-day emotional strain and tension which all employees
must experience. Only if the "fortuitous event unexpected
and unforeseen" can be said to be so out of the ordinary from
24. Britton v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 549, 22 N.W.2d 525 (1946); Marinette
County Fair Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wis. 552, 8 N.W.2d 268 (1943); City of
Hudson v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 476, 6 N.W.2d 217 (1942); Heineman Lumber
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 226 Wis. 373, 276 N.W. 343 (1937); Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis. 527, 272 N.W. 481 (1937).
25. 72 Wis. 2d at 36, 240 N.W.2d at 428.
26. 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
27. Wis. STAT. ch. 102 (1973).
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the countless emotional strains and differences that employees encounter daily without serious mental injury will liability under ch. 102, Stats., be found.3
As with any rule allowing recovery for mental injury, this
standard is necessarily imprecise and takes definite shape only
through a case-by-case application to specific fact situations.
The court's decision this term in Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations9 further defines
the kind of injury compensable under the School District rule.
The claimant in Swiss Colony was diagnosed as schizophrenic, with a twenty-five percent permanent disability because she was unable to resume her former job, although she
returned to full-time work in a lower position. Before the injury, she had been the purchasing agent for Swiss Colony, a
mail order cheese company. The facts that (1) the company's
business was heavily seasonal, and (2) in ten years it had expanded from two million dollars of gross sales to thirteen million dollars were found to be sufficient to establish that the job
was unusually nerve-wracking and created greater pressures
than the average employee would face.
In addition, about a year before the claimant became
disabled she was placed under a superior whom the court characterized as "negative, brusque, and belittling. ' 30 The supervisor regularly challenged and criticized her decisions and required the claimant to do excessive amounts of work. She regularly worked over fifty hours a week, took work home, and was
compelled to cancel two planned vacations due to her workload. The employer did not seriously dispute that work pressures caused her breakdown and subsequent permanent disability.
The court held that the combination of factors shown in
Swiss Colony easily met the School Districtrule that nontraumatically caused mental injury, to be compensable, must
result from emotional strains and tensions greater than those
normally faced by all employees.
C. Dependents' Benefits Under Section 102.49
In Schwartz v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human
28. 62 Wis. 2d at 377, 215 N.W.2d at 377.
29. 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976).
30. Id. at 52, 240 N.W.2d at 131.
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Relations,3' the court was asked to decide the relationship between sections 102.5732 and 102.49. 3 Section 102.57 provides
that when a compensable injury is caused by an employer's
violation of a statute or a lawful department order, compensation and death benefits are to be increased fifteen percent.
Section 102.49 creates a state fund to pay death benefits to
dependent children of a person receiving spouse's death benefits provided under section 102.46. 31 Affirming the decisions of
the department and the circuit court, the Wisconsin court held
that section 102.57 does not require the employer to pay increased benefits to surviving dependent children under section
102.49.
The court gave only a minimal explanation of its reasoning.
The principal ground for the decision was that the legislative
intent in creating the state fund for dependent children of fatally injured employees was to spread the burden of their support equally among all employers. This would avoid possible
discrimination in employment of workers with large families.
Requiring an employer to pay a percentage increase of the fund
payment would run counter to this policy.
The court was also heavily influenced by the fact that the
department has consistently ruled since the section's enactment more than fifty years ago that section
102.49 benefits are
3
not subject to the percentage increase.

1

31. 72 Wis. 2d 217, 240 N.W.2d 173 (1976).
32. Wis. STAT. § 102.57 (1973):
Where injury is caused by the failure of the employer to comply with any statute
or any lawful order of the department, compensation and death benefits as
provided in this chapter shall be increased 15% but not more than a total
increase of $7,500. Failure of an employer reasonably to enforce compliance by
employes with such statute or order of the department shall constitute failure
by the employer to comply with such statute or order.
33. Wls. STAT. § 102.49 (1973). Subsection (1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Where the beneficiary under s. 102.46 or a. 102.47(1) is the wife or husband
of the deceased employe and is wholly dependent for support, an additional
death benefit shall be paid from the funds provided by sub. (5) for each child
by their marriage living at the time of the death of the employe, and who is
likewise dependent upon him for support.
34. Wis. STAT. § 102.46 (1973):
Where death proximately results from the injury and the deceased leaves a
person wholly dependent upon him for support, the death benefit shall equal
four times his average annual earnings, but when added to the disability indemnity paid and due at the time of death, shall not exceed seventy per cent of
weekly wage for the number of weeks set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
subsection (3) of section 102.44, based on the age of the deceased at the time of
his injury.
35. 1923 Wis. Laws, ch. 328.
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D. Compromise Agreements
Section 102.166 of the Worker's Compensation Act permits
settlement of disputed claims by a compromise agreement between employer and employee, subject to DIHLR approval. In
LaCrosseLutheran Hospital v. Oldenburg,37 the employee and
employer had entered into such an agreement. The agreement
provided that the employer would pay the employee a single
lump sum payment with no provision for payment of hospital
or medical bills. Included in the agreement was a disclaimer of
liability by the employer. The plaintiff hospital commenced an
action against the employer to recover the value of expenses
incurred by the employee for treatment of the allegedly compensable injury. The hospital claimed that the employer was
liable for the expenses and that the compromise agreement did
not preclude a third-party claim against the employer.
The trial court overruled the employer's demurrer. The supreme court reversed, holding that the employer was not liable
to the hospital under the facts alleged. The court ruled that
when the employer denies liability in a compromise agreement
approved by the department, any payment under the agreement fully discharges the employer's liability. It was explained
that since public policy favors the compromise of disputed
claims, a third party should not be permitted to force a case
to litigation in order to determine the employer's liability if the
employer and employee are willing to settle.
Ill.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

In McGraw-Edison Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations,3 the supreme court held that a lump
sum retirement benefit, elected by an employee, offset
unemployment compensation benefits provided throughout the
period of the employee's entitlement to the unemployment3
benefits. At issue was the construction of section 102.04(15), 1
which states the circumstances under which retirement benefits offset unemployment compensation benefits. That statute
requires an offset if "the employee is receiving or has claimed
and will receive, or has been retired at such employer's compul36.
37.
38.
39.

Wis. STAT.
73 Wis. 2d
72 Wis. 2d
Wis. STAT.

§ 102.16 (1973).
71, 241 N.W.2d 875 (1976).
99, 240 N.W.2d 148 (1976).
§ 108.04(15) (1973).
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sory retirement age and could claim and receive, retirement
payments, as to any week covered by his benefit claim under a
group retirement system to whose financing any employing
unit has substantially contributed."4
Two employees of McGraw-Edison had elected to take their
retirement benefits, to which the employer had made most of
the contributions, in single lump sum payments. The alternate
payment methods available were a lifetime monthly annuity or
installment payments over a set period. The employees also
claimed unemployment compensation benefits on the theory
that under the language of section 102.04(15) the lump sum
payment would only offset unemployment benefits during the
week in which the payment was actually made.
The department, giving the statute a very literal construction, upheld this theory, ruling that the lump sum retirement
benefit should not offset unemployment benefits in any subsequent week. The supreme court, however, decided that for purposes of computing unemployment benefits a lump sum retirement benefit was to be allocated on a weekly basis over a period
of time, with the amount of each weekly allocation offsetting
unemployment compensation for that week. The formula for
determining the weekly allocation, the court held, was the
"weekly value of a lifetime annuity that could be purchased
with the amount of the lump-sum payment."
The court added in dicta that the same weekly allocation
principle would apply to an annuity or installment payment
method. It said that the weekly value of a lifetime annuity
retirement benefit would be the amount of each payment divided by the number of weeks between payments. The court,
however, refused to consider the more difficult problem of determining an allocation formula for the installment payment
option, which might extend beyond the employee's life expectancy.
In arriving at its decision, the court relied heavily on the
fact that the legislative intent of the unemployment statute
was to avoid multiple and windfall benefits. It also noted the
policy consideration that refusing an offset of unemployment
compensation benefits would have the detrimental effect of
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. 72 Wis. 2d at 108, 240 N.W.2d at 153.

19771

TERM OF THE COURT

discouraging employers from offering the lump sum option to
their retiring employees.
IV.

MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT

A. Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining between school boards and teachers'
associations often presents problems in that many factors affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment are also
closely involved with educational policy decisions. In Beloit
Education Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission,42 the court set a test for determining which areas
are mandatory collective bargaining subjects in school boardteachers' association bargaining.
The case came before the court oh the school board's petition for a declaratory ruling4 3 on the question of whether proposals submitted by the association were mandatory bargaining subjects under section 111.70(1) (d). This section states that
municipal employers must collectively bargain with employees
in regard to wages, hours and conditions of employment."
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
(WERC) had adopted the rule that areas primarily related to
wages, hours or conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining. The court upheld the WERC, stating, "The
commission construed the statute to require mandatory bargaining as to (1) matters which are primarilyrelated to 'wages,
hours and conditions of employment,' and (2) the impact of
the 'establishment of educational policy' affecting the 'wages,
hours and conditions of employment.' We agree with that
construction."4 5 It declined to formulate more specific guidelines for applying the "primarily related" test, preferring a
case-by-case application of the basic rule.
In determining the standard for review of WERC decisions
under the "primarily related" test for mandatory bargaining,
the supreme court reserved substantial review power. It refused
to adopt the usual standard that an administrative agency's
interpretation of a statute that the agency is required to admin42.
43.
44.
45.

73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976).
Declaratory rulings are authorized by Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(b) (1973).
Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(d) (1973).
73 Wis. 2d at 54, 242 N.W.2d at 236 (emphasis in original).
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ister is entitled to great weight.,, The court decided that this
rule applies only if the administrative interpretation is of long
standing and has not encountered legislative or judicial challenge. Instead, the court adopted what it called the "great
bearing" or "due weight" standard, stated in City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,4 7 that
the reviewing court "is not bound by the interpretation given
to a statute by an administrative agency. Nevertheless, that
interpretation has great bearing on the determination as to
what the appropriate construction should be." 48
Applying the "primarily related" test to the bargaining proposals made by the association, the court held the following
areas were subject to mandatory collective bargaining: teacher
evaluation procedures; teacher access to personnel files insofar
as the files contain material relative to evaluation or continued
employment; mandatory notice and hearing procedures in disciplinary actions, including contract nonrenewal; procedures
followed in teacher layoffs, so long as the board's right to determine curriculum is not thereby impaired; procedures for dealing with student misbehavior that presents a physical threat to
the teacher's safety; aspects of the school calendar that are
primarily related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment;49 in-service training; and the impact of class size as it
bears on wages, hours and conditions of employment.
B. Definition of "ManagerialEmployee"
The Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act" was
amended in 1971 to cover "any individual employed by a municipal employer other than an independent contractor, supervisor, or confidential, managerial or executive employee." ' 51
The supreme court this term, in City of Milwaukee v. Wiscon46. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 48 Wis.
2d 272, 179 N.W.2d 805 (1970).
47. 71 Wis. 2d 709, 239 N.W.2d 63 (1976).
48. 73 Wis. 2d at 68, 242 N.W.2d at 243, quoting 71 Wis. 2d at 714, 239 N.W.2d at
66.
49. The association had not submitted any specific calendar proposals. The court
held that while the school calendar is generally a subject for management determination, there are aspects of calendaring that are closely related to wages, hours and
conditions of employment, such as scheduling educational conventions and in-service
training. 73 Wis. 2d at 61-62, 242 N.W.2d at 239-40.
50. Wis. STAT. § 111.70 et seq. (1973).
51. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(b), amended by 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 124.
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sin Employment Relations Commission,52 construed "managerial employee" under this section.
At issue was whether the Milwaukee assistant city attorneys were excluded from forming a collective bargaining unit
as "managerial employees." The WERC held that they were
not excluded, as did the circuit court on appeal. The supreme
court affirmed, adopting the WERC definition of managerial
employee, stated by the court as "those who participate in the
formulation, determination and implementation of management policy or possess effective authority to commit the employer's resources." 53
The city had urged adoption of the broader definition used
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in interpreting
the National Labor Relations Act, "those who formulate and
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative decisions of their employer."54 The court, however, considered only whether the WERC definition was reasonable and
consistent with the purpose of the statute. Concluding that it
was, the court looked especially to the fact that the Act expressly provides for coverage of professional employees5 and
that the comparable act covering state employees" specifically
57
includes state-employed attorneys.

The parties agreed that under the WERC definition the
assistant city attorneys were not managerial employees under
the act, so the court did not discuss the application of this
definition to the facts of the case.
C. Municipal Employee Strikes
In Joint School District v. Wisconsin Rapids Education
Association,18 the court addressed several issues relating to
municipal employee strikes. The case arose out of a 1974 strike
by teachers in the Wisconsin Rapids area. When the teachers
went on strike, the board of education began an action in its
own name demanding an injunction forcing the strikers back
to work.
52. 71 Wis. 2d 709, 239 N.W.2d 63 (1976).
53. 71 Wis. 2d at 716, 239 N.W.2d at 67.
54. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div'n of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 286 (1974),
quoted in 71 Wis. 2d at 716, 239 N.W.2d at 67.
55. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(1) (1973).
56. Wis. STAT. § 111.80 et seq. (1973).
57. Wis. STAT. § 111.81(3)(a)6.c. (1973).
58. 70 Wis. 2d 292, 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975).
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In response to the association's argument that the board
lacked capacity to sue, the court, expanding its recent holding
59 held that in seeking an
in Flood v. Board of Education,
injunction against a teachers' strike, a board of education has
interests identical to those of the school district and is therefore
a proper party. The Flood decision was based on an estoppel
theory. In Joint School District, however, the court examined
the functions of the board, placing particular emphasis on the
fact that the board was responsible for contract negotiations
with the teachers and for managing school operations. The
court concluded that for purposes of this action, the interests
of the board were indistinguishable from those of the district.
The association also argued that sections 103.56(1)" and
103.63,6" the Wisconsin Little Norris-LaGuardia Act, restricted
the power of the circuit court to issue an injunction. The Wisconsin court, following rulings in jurisdictions with similar
statutes, 2 held that the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act did not
control actions brought by states or political subdivisions seeking injunctive relief against striking government employees.
The decision was also based on the principle that statutory
restrictions on injunctive power should be strictly limited to
the terms of the statute and on the fact that Wisconsin has
other statutory provisions expressly controlling municipal
labor relations. 3
Arguing in the alternative, the association contended that
the general rules on injunctions" required the school board to
show irreparable harm before an injunction could be granted.
The board countered with the argument that there was no need
to show actual harm if the strike was illegal, as was a strike by
municipal employees. 5 The court acknowledged that such a
rule has been followed in some jurisdictions, and that Wisconsin has recognized the rule in situations where there has been
a legislative or judicial determination that the activity per se
6
causes irreparable harm.
59. 69 Wis. 2d 184, 230 N.W.2d 711 (1975).
60. Wis. STAT. § 103.56(1) (1973).

61. Wis. STAT. § 103.62 (1973).
62. See 48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 1471 (1970) for a discussion
of these cases.
63. See Wis. STAT. § 111.70 et seq. (1973).
64. Wis. STAT. § 813.02(1) (1973).
65. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(1) (1973).

66. Vogt, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 695, 270 Wis. 315, 71 N.W.2d 359, 74 N.W.2d 749,
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The court held, however, that there is no such legislative or
judicial determination in the case of municipal employee
strikes and that, on the contrary, section 111.70(6)67 declares a
policy encouraging voluntary settlement of municipal labor
disputes by the parties. For these reasons, the court held that
there must be an actual showing of irreparable harm before an
injunction would issue.
Municipal employee strikes received further consideration
in Kenosha Unified School District v. Kenosha Education
5 wherein the court ruled on the power of a state
Association,"
court to impose fines for contempt on the grounds of violation
of an injunction.
The trial court in Kenosha Unified issued an injunction
ordering striking teachers to return to work. When the injunction was ignored, the court found both the individual teachers
and the association in contempt and imposed a fine of ten
dollars per day on the individual teachers and a total fine of
three thousand dollars on the association. The association
argued that under section 111.70(7),s the court had power to
fine only the individual teachers in contempt.
The supreme court agreed that section 111.70(7) authorizes
imposition of fines only upon individual strikers. Its reasoning
was based on the language of the statute that "whoever" violates section 111.70(4) (1) shall be fined, with the fine to be paid
by means of a salary deduction. The court reasoned that these
references clearly show a legislative intent that only individual
persons be covered under the section. The court, however, went
on to rule that since a labor organization has the capacity to
sue and be sued on behalf of its members, 0 it necessarily can
be held in contempt of court under the Wisconsin civil contempt statutes.7 '
aff'd, 354 U.S. 284 (1956).
67. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(6) (1973).
68. 70 Wis. 2d 325, 234 N.W.2d 311 (1975).
69. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(7) (1973):
Whoever violates sub. (4)(1) after an injunction against such a strike has been
issued shall be fined $10. After the injunction has been issued, any employe who
is absent from work because of purported illness shall be presumed to be on
strike unless the illness is verified by a written report from a physician to the
employer. Each day of continued violation constitutes a separate offense. The
court shall order that any fine imposed under this subsection be paid by means
of a salary deduction at a rate to be determined by the court.
70. Fray v. Meat Cutters Local 248, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960).
71. Wis. STAT. ch. 295 (1973).
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The court next considered the amount of the fine that may
be imposed on an unincorporated association. Looking to the
civil contempt statutes, it held that section 295.1472 required
the fine in this case to be limited to two hundred fifty dollars
plus costs and expenses, since there was no showing of actual
damages. The court, however, opened the door to the possibility that in an appropriate case, the dollar limit set by section
295.14 could be found to be an invalid restriction on the inherent power of a court to punish for contempt. It was stated that
the legislature may regulate the power to punish for contempt
but "may not diminish it so as to render it ineffectual."7 3 The
court ruled that to exceed the statutory maximum, there must
be a specific trial court finding that the contempt power would
be rendered ineffectual. Since there was no such finding in
Kenosha Unified, the statutory limit precluded imposition of
a greater fine.
MARY

F.

WYANT

MISCELLANEOUS
1.

OPEN MEETING LAW

In State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta,' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the applicability of Wisconsin's open meeting
law2 to closed sessions of a state legislative committee where it
was questionable whether those members in attendance, all of
whom were from a single political party, acted in the capacity
of a political caucus or a legislative body. This case was an
original action for declaratory relieP challenging the legality of
72. Wis. STAT. § 295.14 (1973):
If an actual loss or injury has been produced to any party by the misconduct
alleged, the court shall order a sufficient sum to be paid by the defendant to
such party to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses, instead of
imposing a fine upon such defendant; and in such case the payment and acceptance of such sum shall be an absolute bar to any action by such aggrieved party
to recover damages for such injury or loss. Where no such actual loss or injury
has been produced the fine shall not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars over
and above the costs and expenses of the proceedings.
73. 70 Wis. 2d at 335, 234 N.W.2d at 316.

1. 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976).

2. Wis.

STAT.

§ 66.77 (1973).

3. The court discussed at some length the propriety of rendering a declaratory

